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This paper argues that the current calls for a practice turn in International Relations
(IR) while positive in many respects, are problematic and potentially limiting because
they are premised on a confused understanding of the role of philosophy and realist
philosophy in particular and a restricted view of the role of sociological investigation.
This arises from the problematic tendency to lapse into advocacy of an anti-realist
philosophical and sociological imagination.We suggest that the problems that practice
theorists point to should lead not to knee-jerk anti-realism but rather can motivate a
reinvigorated conversation with realism. This entails revisiting the role of philosophy,
realism, and sociology in the study of practices. We argue that far from being
antithetical to practice theory, a reconsideration of realist philosophy helps make sense
of the role of practice and provides those advocating practice theory with better tools
to deal with the challenges which motivated the development of these theoretical
stances. Reconsidering realism entails, however, a reconsideration of a wider social
ontology within which practice takes place, and openness to the role of philosophical
and theoretical abstractions in teasing out the role of practice.
Keywords: practice theory; critical realism; scientiﬁc realism; Bourdieu;
structure
In recent work there has been a growing momentum in favour of something
called a practice turn in International Relations (IR). This turn consists of
various strands of theorising, ranging widely from advocates of pragmatist
analysis to followers of Bourdieu and exponents of Actor Network Theory
(ANT) and assemblages. However, despite the differences of orientation
which characterize these strands of practice theory there are also common
themes that motivate them. Against constructivism’s focus on ‘inter-sub-
jective’ norms, and the obsessive concentration of many meta-theorists on
‘abstract’ theoretical questions of ‘structure and agency’, practice theorists
seek to reorient how we understand international politics. They ask us to
focus on analysis of an aspect of international politics which often goes
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unnoticed and unappreciated within existing theoretical perspectives.
Theorists seeking a ‘practice turn’ ask us to focus on analysis of what
they call ‘practices’, often unconscious and habitual, and ‘background
dispositions’ acquired through practice (Pouliot 2008, 258).
As Vincent Pouliot powerfully argues, a practice turn is deemed necessary
because practice theory is uniquely able to take on what he calls the
‘representational bias’ of IR theories, whether rational choice or
constructivist. This bias arises from the attempts to explain ‘from the
outside’, from an abstract, God-like ‘IR theoretical’ point of view,
the patterns we ‘see’ in international politics, without ﬁrst studying from the
‘ground-up’ how various agents of international politics, its diplomats, its
social movement activists, its bureaucrats, actually understand their world
and act in it. An approach attentive to practice is necessary as it brings to
our attention the practices of world political actors and thus also reveals
the implicit forms of ‘background knowledge’ embedded in their practices.
In so doing the practice turn seeks to contribute to IR analysis moving away
from ‘armchair analysis’ and closer to actualities of global political practice
(Neumann cited in Pouliot 2008, 259).
Pouliot’s (2007) methodological work speciﬁed what a more sociological
move offers to IR: movement away from abstract theorizing in favour of
attentiveness to practices in context. ANT theorists, while less willing to use
the term ‘sociology’ (itself considered an abstraction which assumes a
separate ‘social realm’) have also speciﬁed what a more association-attuned
approach would entail in IR including methodological tools for keeping
researchers attuned to analysis of associations as we ﬁnd them (Bueger
2013). An implicit move to a sociological attitude is present here too, if only
in the form of a critique of abstract IR theorizing.
The call for more sociological knowledge in IR has also been captured in
work arguing for better understandings of IR scholars and their social
context. Inanna Hamati-Ataya’s work (2012a, 2012b, 2013) for example
has provocatively called for a sociological turn in the analysis of knowledge
construction in the IR discipline itself. This is because: ‘If we adopt an
abstract understanding of theory that treats the theorist as operating over
and above the world that she studies, then we cannot produce genuine
social science of the kind that inﬂuences the conduct and practice of world
politics’ (Hamati-Ataya 2013).
Similar interests have guided established approaches that reﬂect
Wittgensteinian and pragmatist inﬂuences, particularly in their desire to
situate everything within the realm of practices and practical knowledge.
Recently reﬂecting on the strengths of the practice turn, Kratochwil argues
that meaning is always constituted by links to other practices and not by
any match between subject and object (Kratochwil 2011, 37). Indeed, he
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goes furthest of all practice theorists in claiming to reject philosophy itself
on the grounds that it supposes a way that things really are (Kratochwil
2011, 45). While some forms of practice theory would appear to be
sympathetic to philosophical argument, there is nevertheless a widespread
scepticism towards conceptual abstraction beyond the realm of practices
that is implicit in many of the arguments for the practice turn. We shall
challenge such views from the perspective of critical realist philosophy.
In this piece we approach practice theory – in the ﬁrst instance practice
theory associated with Bourdieu – from the perspective of critical realism in
order to draw out three issues that are in need of further, and more
nuanced, consideration among those interested in developing and applying
practice theory – philosophical argument and abstraction, conception of
social structure, and understanding of sociology of practices.
Critical realism is located within the wider scientiﬁc or philosophical
realist approach. We make a case here for philosophical and scientiﬁc
realism but base our arguments, for clarity’s sake, on the critical realist
moves.1 This means that we accept Roy Bhaskar’s particular understanding
of the role of philosophy, ﬁrst and foremost, as an underlabourer to the
sciences. This seeks to clarify the method of investigation, analysing
conceptual claims, rendering explicit those assumptions that are often
implicit, drawing attention to the ontological claims that lie behind these
and, most generally, producing knowledge of the necessary conditions for
the production of knowledge and practice of science (Bhaskar 1989, 8). We
suggest that an engagement with critical realism enables us to show why
practice matters as well as how. It can also help to establish a wider and
more open approach to the otherwise very welcome ‘sociological turn’ in
IR. We choose the critical realist variant of realism here because of its
greater emphasis on the possibility of understanding something like social
structure as well as its more radical understanding of the relationship
between structures, practices, and agents as a transformative and
potentially emancipatory one. We also ﬁnd merit in critical realism’s
emphasis on depth ontology and social stratiﬁcation which we ﬁnd parti-
cularly useful in critiquing some of the claims of practice theory. These
arguments of critical realism need not, however, lead to a wholesale
rejection of the arguments of practice theory. To clarify, we argue here
that the study of practices can be proﬁtably dealt with within a realist,
1 Terminological confusion is an ever-present difﬁculty in discussions of realist philosophy. In
this article we make reference to philosophical realism, an umbrella term for various realist
philosophies, scientiﬁc realism, Pouliot’s and some others’ favoured term for speciﬁc strands of
philosophical realism which ground a philosophically realist position on science and ‘critical
realism’, which is a particular sub-type of philosophical and scientiﬁc realisms.
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speciﬁcally critical realist, philosophical frame. We wish to argue that
practice theorizing need not insist, negatively, on the rejection of philo-
sophical realism and various associated ontological claims, but can, and
historically already has, fruitfully accommodated assumptions which push
in different directions.
We outline how critical realism can contribute positively to an
understanding of practice and practice theory in three ways starting with
a discussion of philosophy and the need for conceptual abstraction. If
practice theorists rightly draw attention to the complex, messy, and
overlapping nature of social processes, then there is all the more need for
careful abstraction and conceptualization in order to identify the various
components and inﬂuences and to consider how they combine and interact
(Sayer 2000, 19). We advocate a critical realist approach in order to show
how this can be done.
Following this discussion the article moves to show how the problematic
approach to abstraction leads to difﬁculties when it comes to the practice turn’s
mode of addressing the issue of how to theorise ‘social structure’. In dealing
with structure, we focus our discussion of structure in relation to Pierre
Bourdieu’s work in order to problematize the relationship between structure,
agency, and practice. Although recognizing that Bourdieu’s work is not
representative of the practice turn as a whole, we focus on it here both because
of its current popularity in IR, and because we believe it offers signiﬁcant
opportunities for a realist reading and reconstruction. Also, while the insights
we develop in this section arise from and directly relate to practice theory
engagements with Bourdieu, we also claim that the misreadings of Bourdieu
may offer wider cautionary tales for consideration by other practice theorists
who might wish to do away with attempts to theorise ‘social structure’.
Finally, we identify how the failures to adequately address philosophy,
realism, and abstraction in fact frustrate, rather than promote, a
‘sociological turn’. We argue that critiques of realism lead to a very speciﬁc
and, in our view, limited sociology of practices. With a particular focus on
the arguments of Bourdieu, but driven by a belief that these arguments can
also speak to engagements with approaches like ANT, we suggest that a
realist corrective, based on a wider and deeper social ontology, is not only
possible but desirable as an alternative avenue through which to address the
very issues that practice theorists were concerned with in initiating
their theoretical interventions.
Recognition of the positive contribution realism can make in debate on
(limits of) practice theory is of importance in IR today because, as the
practice turn has quickly become a leading new theoretical orientation to
the study of International Relations, its consequences and implications
for the study of IR are in danger of being misunderstood as a form of
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anti-realism and anti-(meta) theory. Practice theory is fast becoming the
mainstream rival to constructivism, realism, and liberalism and attracting
students from various theoretical traditions, including poststructuralism,
constructivism, and postcolonialism and it is thus likely to continue to
shape the discipline of IR in the next two decades. According to Kustermans
(2016) it makes three promises – philosophically to overcome entrenched
dualisms, theoretically to help account for change in world politics, and
methodologically to account for politics as it actually occurs. How we
approach, reﬂect upon, teach and utilize this research tradition then is
of crucial signiﬁcance. This article is an attempt to demonstrate that the
practice turn needs to be both celebrated and its empirical insights
welcomed, but also that it can be fruitfully critically interrogated and
reframed. Through such reframing we may be able to more sharply observe
both the limitations of this tradition and the potential that exists to extend it
and augment it. At a minimum a conversation and a moment’s reﬂection is,
we hope, achieved through interpreting the insights of practice theory
through a realist rather than an anti-realist lens.
Practice theory, philosophy, and abstraction
Practice theory is a broad term. There are disputes about what it is and what
it says. We agree with recent interventions that suggest that we need to
distinguish, for example, between a more Aristotelian focus on praxis or
action and a more Wittgensteinian focus on social rules and framework
(Frost and Lechner 2016); or between a pragmatic approach focused on
action with fewer if any structural connotations, and a critical approach
(usually drawing on Bourdieu) that embeds practice in power and
hierarchies (Bueger and Gadinger 2015, 154–155). Recognizing this
diversity, we do not wish to suggest that all practice theorists make similar
arguments. Indeed, we go on to indicate some signiﬁcant divergences on
issues to do with philosophy, realism, and social structure. However,
despite a lack of agreement on just what practices actually are and in
what shared practice consists (Barnes 2001, 17), there are certain key
orientations we can point to in practice theory.
In one of the major works on practice theory, Theodore Schatzki argues
that practice theorists are united in their concern with the way that
phenomena such as knowledge and meaning, science, power, language and
social institutions are a part of the ‘ﬁeld of practices’ and that the central
core of practices are ‘embodied, materially mediated arrays of human
activity centrally organized around shared practical understanding’
(Schatzki 2001, 2). In so doing, practice theory takes a materialist approach
in seeing the social as a ‘ﬁeld of embodied, materially interwoven practices
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centrally organized around shared practical understandings’ (Schatzki
2001, 3).
These arguments are echoed in recent work by Bueger and Gadinger
that considers the practice turn in IR. Although noting the diversity of
approaches being advocated, they identify core commonalities as: emphasis
on process over stasis; development of an account of knowledge as action
and the unity of doing and knowing; recognition of grasping knowledge as
a collective process; advocacy of an approach that recognizes non-human
elements as part of practices; rejection of a single reality in favour of a
multiplicity of orders; and acceptance of a performative understanding of
the world (Bueger and Gadinger 2014, 19–20, 2015, 453).
In IR practice theory has been developed from different angles: from the
perspectives of Bourdieu and Latour as well as the ‘classical’ pragmatist
perspectives. While each comes with differences of orientation, partially
ﬂeshed out below, central to all has been questioning reliance on
abstract notions such as ‘scientiﬁc method’, ‘inter-subjectivity’, or
‘agency and structure’ in concrete explanations of international politics.
This is partly because these terms problematically ‘orient’ our analyses of
‘practice’. Instead of simply replicating the discipline’s use of abstract terms
and theoretical moves, practice theorists suggest that theorizing practice in
the absence of actual practices makes little sense. The practice turn at its
base calls for a more sociologically attuned focus on actual practices of
international relations policy-makers, practitioners, and indeed scholars.
As Kustermans notes, the focus is on the tangible and observable, the
‘commonplace’, the surface and the ontic level of reality ‘where the
common sense realist dwells’ (2016, 191). Hence this focus is accompanied
by a more sceptical attitude to abstract ‘theory’ as well as, relatedly,
metaphysical philosophical claims which specify ‘objects’ abstractly,
outside of consideration of practice. It is this sceptical attitude we wish to
address here ﬁrst, and the ways in which it can lead to a poor understanding
of the role of philosophy, particularly as an underlabourer, and of realism
as a philosophical approach to the social world.
A potent example of an abstraction-wary practice theorist in IR is
Vincent Pouliot and our critique of practice theory in this section focuses
mainly on his arguments. His scepticism of general IR theoretical and
philosophical frameworks is reﬂected in his rejection of the ‘epistemic’
obsessions of Western thinkers. It is the tendency to abstract and ‘look
down from up high’ on social developments that is problematic about
epistemic practices: ‘progressively the godlike posture of modern science,
which looks at the world from above, triumphed over practical knowledge’
(Pouliot 2008, 260). As the ‘totalising representations’ of maps do not
‘convey the practical operations that made them possible’, in the same
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sense IR theorists’ frameworks centred on epistemological concerns about
‘inter-subjectivity’ or ‘rational choice’ blind us to the practical nature of
the actual workings of international politics.
This is because abstractions lead to misreadings of what goes on in
international politics, for ‘one cannot impute to practitioners [of inter-
national politics] a theoretical perspective [as IR theorists tend to] that is
made possible by looking at social action backwards and from above’
(Pouliot 2008, 262). Theoretical and indeed philosophical categories
and abstractions do not allow room for ‘properly theorizing practical
knowledge’ (Pouliot 2008, 262). Thus, for example, abstractions such as
agency and structure are to be rethought: ‘Agency is not simply about
“defying” structures by making choices independently of them. It is claimed
to be a matter of instantiating structures, old and new, in and through
practice. Without practice, intersubjective realities would falter; thus
agency (or the enactment of practice) is what makes social reality possible in
the ﬁrst place’ (Pouliot 2008, 264). Postmodernists as much as scientiﬁc
realists are critiqued for not centring their analysis on practices but
rather abstract notions of ontology, discourse, or language games (Pouliot
2008, 265).
For Pouliot, scientiﬁc realism is particularly prone to problematic
tendencies to abstract, speciﬁcally through its insistence on the primacy of
ontology and thus its insistence on the reality of objects of scientiﬁc study.
Pouliot rejects as problematic (and dangerous) the idea of a ‘world before
knowledge’ as it ‘leads to reifying one’s commonsensical and/or scientiﬁc
representations as natural and universal’ (Pouliot 2007, 363). He also
rejects as hubris the insistence by realists that our models are depicting
‘really real’ realities. Science for Pouliot is not about ‘deﬁning big-R Reality’
as his postfoundationalist constructivism seeks to ‘problematize what is
held to be real by looking into the constitutive effects of knowledge’ (2007,
363). A turn to a sociological analysis of actors needs to be prioritized over
predilictions of (meta)theorists.
The ANT approaches have a somewhat more complicated, yet not
dissimilar orientation to sociology. The Latourian ‘Actor-Network
Theory’ which has made notable inroads into IR (Best and Walters 2013;
Bueger 2013, 2014, 2; Nexon and Pouliot 2013) draws on Latour’s (2005,
2010) analysis of scientiﬁc practices. Instead of assuming ‘we know’ what
actors are up to and that we can position, categorize and explain their
actions and motivations on the basis of social scientists’ abstract theories
and concepts, Latour suggests we need to pay attention to the associations
that actors or ‘actants’, social and natural, human and non-human, are
networked in. He explicitly argues for a ‘ﬂat ontology’ in the study of social
life suggesting that this helps render the social world more clearly visible
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(2005, 16). This idea of visibility relates to an anti-abstraction position.
Bueger and Gadinger (2014, 65) make this clear when they write
that keeping ontology ﬂat means reconceptualising the ideas that rely on
construction of different levels and layers. This in IR means revisiting such
things as system and unit, micro andmacro, and local and global. Instead of
working with philosophical or theoretical abstractions which create in our
imaginations ‘social structures’, ‘social relations’, or indeed a realm of
‘social reality’, Latour argues we should simply focus on what we observe
and describe: the networks and interactions of things in them. This is crucial
because for him the critical edge of social sciences has been lost because of
social theorists’ almost ideological commitment to abstract categories of
explanation which are imposed upon the ‘objects’ of analysis (Latour 2004,
2010). These abstractions ‘reproduce’ forms of life rather than enabling
a critique of them.
Here there is a scepticism even of the gloriﬁcation of ‘sociology’ as an
answer – for Latour (2005), for example, it could be said that ‘sociology’ is
part of the problem with its ‘social theoretical’ abstractions – yet similarly
to practice theorists a closer study of actors in ‘society’ and ‘the world’,
without philosophical foundations and abstractions, can help. Christian
Bueger perhaps more than most has sought to show what the implications
of an ANT-perspective are. He acknowledges that ANT ‘shares many
concerns with the pragmatist and practice theoretical ideas’ and akin to
them advises that ‘researchers…seek proximity to the practices studied,
to build theory from empirical insights and to rethink the character of
representation’ (Bueger 2013, 338). He points out the futility of starting
research by assuming philosophical dualities as they ‘come at a too
high price and might prevent us from understanding what we want to
know’ (Bueger 2013, 339). He ‘encourages us to build new conceptual
apparatuses which do not rely on prior ontological commitments’ (Bueger
2013, 340). Bueger’s approach is consistent with the new interest in
assemblage theory that draws on Latour and pragmatist philosophers as
well as DeLanda and Deleuze and Guattari. In the ﬁrst IR text to address
this approach, Acuto and Curtis (2014) argue that it is possible to
comprehend hybrids of different material, biological, social and techno-
logical components (assemblages) only by rejecting such reiﬁed general
categories and abstract concepts like state, market, city, society, and
capitalism. These are seen as reﬂecting ‘modernist’ thought rather than
helping us to understand contemporary crises (Acuto and Curtis 2014, 2).
These critiques are interesting for at the heart of them lies an important
critique of ‘reifying’ social theory which, instead of being puzzled by the
world, too readily reaches for abstract philosophical solutions and concepts
which then becomemoulds within which empirical observations are forced.
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We agree with this critique and thus the motivations for the turn to practice
that informs the originators of practice theory, such as Bourdieu and
Latour. Yet, we disagree with the view that in taking on these challenges it is
a correct move to sidestep abstraction and philosophical underlabouring as
if these simply reﬂect ‘modernist thought’. Instead of lapsing into anti-
realism, philosophical realism, if examined properly, can be of assistance to
practice theorists in responding to these challenges.
Revisiting realist philosophy
Strangely, despite the fact that in general the move towards practice
sociology has been associated with (new) ‘materialism’ (rather than
the more idealistic linguistic and discourse analysis approaches of
poststructuralists and constructivists), the current IR practice turn
arguments do not address realism in any detail and when they do, actively
reject, as Pouliot’s comments for example showed, what is perceived as
‘philosophical’ or ‘scientiﬁc realism’.
By contrast, we start with the broader scientiﬁc realist position precisely
because paradoxically it too starts with practice. Scientiﬁc realism, as a
philosophy of science, argues that to understand the practices of scientists
we need to understand their actions as being best explained as attempts to
uncover the real mechanisms which underpin observable patterns (Bhaskar
1975). It argues that the intelligibility of science presupposes that the world
is structured in a certain way and that despite being mind-independent, it is
open to investigation. Critical realism (Bhaskar 1989) extends this realist
understanding to the social sciences. It argues that the practice of social
science is best understood as an effort to uncover social mechanisms, which
are real even though they are not necessarily as ‘stable’ or consistent in their
manifestations (due to the complexity of social interactions in ‘open
systems’) as those observed in natural science laboratories. Bhaskar’s
critical realism critiques positivism and its vision of science head-on arguing
that social science is not and cannot be seen as a search for observable
regularities alone. But neither should we give up on causal analysis as
postpositivist critics, aghast at positivist scientism, argue (Sayer 2000;
Kurki 2008). Bhaskar argues we can build an epistemologically
pluralist and ontologically realist middle way, which, while sensitive to
‘interpretivism’ and social construction, allows us to make judgements
between accounts based on the belief that some of them are in principle
more reality-congruent than others (although ﬁxed criteria for discerning
which are which are not readily available in social science).
Scientiﬁc and critical realist positions have been introduced into IR by
various scholars such as Colin Wight (2006), Alex Wendt (1999),
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Heikki Patomaki (2002), Jonathan Joseph (2007), and Milja Kurki (2006,
2008). These scholars set out meta-theoretical positions which ground a
critique of positivism in an analysis of scientiﬁc practice. They advocate
postpositivism, but in a form that does not reduce social realities to
language, norms, or beliefs of individuals. They argue for recognition
of theorization and careful study of layered levels of reality making a
distinction between the observed patterns and events and the unobservable
causal structures. They argue importantly, for epistemological pluralism
and methodological opportunism. In fact, contrary to poststructuralist or
positivist philosophical perspectives, realism does not prescribe speciﬁc
methods or epistemologies but leads us to accept that the questions we ask
must direct the tools we use to answer these questions (Patomaki and
Wight, 2001). On the one hand, therefore, critical realism assesses theories
and methods based on their ‘explanatory adequacy’, on the other, it
recognizes that explaining the real world requires a certain degree of
abstraction and conceptualization in order to get at the underlying
structures and mechanisms of this complex reality.
In this article we do not wish to rehearse the arguments revolving around
philosophical, scientiﬁc, and critical realism in general or in IR as these have
been extensively covered elsewhere (see e.g. Joseph andWight 2010). What
is of signiﬁcance for us here is that realists argue for the need to theorise,
that is conceptually abstract, in order to get at the unobservable
causal mechanisms, forces and conditions which structure that which we
empirically observe in social reality: the social world is not ‘transparent’ to
us and in fact for the most part consists of unobservable forces which need
to be conceptualized, often in abstraction, in order to be understood.
Conceptualization is a necessary part of the scientiﬁc process that is
required in order to trace signs of social norms, structures and beliefs in our
empirical analyses.
The practice turn has so far shunned this approach because commitment
to such realist philosophy would seem to entail ‘abstraction’ from the
‘concrete practices’ we are to base our analysis on, positing the existence of
underlying, unobservable social relations, something that a ﬂat ontology
attempts to avoid or exclude. ‘Philosophical’ realism quickly becomes an
anachronism for its (supposed) insistence on seemingly non-sociological
grounds for philosophical claims about the underlying reality of natural
and social kinds. Such prioritization of conceptual abstraction and
ultimately a ‘philosophical perspective’ does not easily ﬁt within the
perspective which foregrounds sociological analysis of practice. These
tendencies towards being sceptical of philosophical realism do not exist in
isolation in IR. It could be argued that they are part of a wider move against
philosophy in the discipline [see e.g. Monteiro and Ruby’s (2009) critique
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of philosophical foundations, Sil and Katzenstein’s (2010) analytical
eclecticism or Lake’s (2011) anti-ismic position].
Despite the prevalence of these sceptical tendencies in IR, we think it is
important to consider further the wisdom of a position which reduces
theorization or philosophy of knowledge itself to the ‘sociological’ focus on
‘practice’. This is because the practice turn is weakened when it seeks to
avoid reﬂection on philosophy and its relationship with sociology.
Indeed, we would like to suggest that the relationship between
philosophy and sociology is far more nuanced than many practice theorists
allow for and we get a sense of this if we reconsider the insights of
the critical realist position on knowledge production and the role of
philosophy. Below, we seek to make two points critical of the current
practice turn: (1) We point out that misunderstandings of realism
characterize the ‘practice’ of criticism of philosophy and realism; (2) We
argue that if understood more accurately realism can, in fact, complement
and add to practice theoretical attempts to develop a more ‘sociological
imagination’ in IR.
First, it is important to point out that realist philosophy has been
signiﬁcantly misunderstood by its critics. Pouliot in particular
misrepresents what realism is. Contrary to what he implies, scientiﬁc or
critical realism does not seek to argue that we have direct access to the
world around us or that our models are ‘really real’. For critical realists, our
knowledge is just as socially conditioned and structured as it is for the
‘sociologically’ inclined Pouliot, or indeed his inspiration, Bourdieu.
However, where critical realists are closer to Bourdieu than they are
to Pouliot is in their belief that, while we cannot have access to pure
knowledge of society, because our accounts are ‘of’ something, not all of
them are ‘equal’ to another and there are strong grounds for exercising
what Bhaskar calls judgmental rationality – that is to say, in preferring one
belief about something to another (Bhaskar 2009, 49). The philosophical
move to ground practice of knowledge-production (or indeed the concrete
practice of science for Bhaskar) on the assumption of ontological reality
(to which we have no direct access) pre-existing ‘our accounts’ is a keymove
on which Bourdieu would arguably agree with realists rather than with
Pouliot. Bourdieu’s sociology, as we discuss below, was arguably grounded
not just in ‘practice’ and ‘sociology’ but ‘philosophical’ acceptance of the
reality of practices and constructions they give rise to. Pouliot’s attempt to
address scientiﬁc realism would beneﬁt from a more detailed reading of
realism and a re-reading of Bourdieu in the more philosophical, rather than
merely ‘sociological’ vein.
ANT analysts similarly misjudge realism in adopting not just a
philosophy-sceptical but a realism-sceptical position. Latour certainly is
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sceptical of ‘philosophical’ realism in that it entails for him a curious set of
questions: why would we ask about whether ‘reality’ exists if we did not
think that in fact our ‘brains were in vats’ with some sort of a ‘reality’
outside it (Latour 1999, 4)? Refusing the inside/outside dichotomy Latour
is not interested in abstract debates on reality, hence his efforts to ﬂatten
ontology and how we approach the world. Yet, Latour is not necessarily an
anti-realist; he certainly works with empirical realism. Further, we argue
here that with an adequate understanding of philosophical realism in hand
even Latour’s approach is not entirely incompatible with philosophical
realism for ironically philosophical realism is in fact an approach that is
directly trying to address the concerns he holds so dear: why do we end up
reproducing the beliefs of subjects in our social theories? We argue that
philosophical realism can help clarify concerns of interest to practice
theorists. It also points to some important problems and contradictions in
practice theory as it is currently conceived.
One such clariﬁcation is recognition of the implicit role of philosophy in
all social science. Realist philosophy’s strength has arguably been to
emphasize that even as social theorists think they are coming to the world
‘pure’ and ‘un-weighed’ by metaphysical systems, embedded in their
thoughts, practices and knowledge are always, in fact, speciﬁc philoso-
phical principles. The assumptions of ‘naïve empiricism’, and even of more
sophisticated empiricisms (whether positivist or post-positivist), need to be
critiqued for denying that the process of knowing is guided by ontological
and epistemological assumptions. Whether it is empiricist insistence on the
objectivity of empirical observation or pragmatist insistence on practical
knowledge, all positions, according to critical realists, are premised on
speciﬁc philosophical systems for connecting knowledge, knowers and the
world (Bhaskar 1975). The beneﬁts of a critical realist approach is that in
acknowledging this and thus rendering these philosophical assumptions
explicit, we can subject them to critical scrutiny.
This criticism is important to keep in mind when considering the
arguments made by practice turn advocates in IR. From a realist perspective
we can observe that in the practice theoretical accounts are indeed
embedded speciﬁc philosophical principles (even if ‘pragmatist’
philosophical principles), which ‘inﬂuence’ their readings of ‘sociology’ and
‘practice’. While keen to avoid a priori commitments, it may be that in so
doing speciﬁc philosophical assumptions (whether on prioritization of
practical knowledge, pluralist epistemology, or irrealist ontology) creep in.
This is not all, for importantly realists point out that sometimes lack of
reﬂection on ontology and epistemology results in theorists becoming
inadvertently informed by problematic kinds of assumptions they have
been seeking to avoid.
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One danger is that those positions that seek to avoid epistemological
solutions often tend to ‘lapse’ into naive empiricism. While sceptical of the
empiricism of positivist approaches, paradoxically, it could be argued that
the prioritization of sociology without philosophical foundations also runs
the risk of empiricist assumptions creeping back in. ‘How do we know
when we know?’ is not a question that can be sociologically resolved
because we are already ‘in’ knowledge structures; yet it is a problem that
can be attenuated by being conscious of the ontological and epistemological
assumptions we bring to our knowledge (of knowledge). The kinds of
challenges Latour’s ‘critique of critique’ poses for social theory then can
be addressed, in a different way, through a realist critique of the
consequences of his own ‘solution’.
Realists also bring to our attention the problems inherent in embracing a
ﬂat ontology. This is to reduce the world ‘that is’ to ‘events’, ‘practices’, and
thus the ‘observable’ and is characteristic of empiricism but also of many
constructivist and postmodernist perspectives. This ﬂat ontology leads
to misunderstandings of causes and processes which do not exist at
‘observable’ levels of reality. As Bhaskar puts it: ‘By secreting an ontology
based on the category of experience, the domains of reality (the domains of
the real, the actual, and the empirical) are collapsed into one. This prevents
the crucial question of the conditions under which experience is, in fact,
signiﬁcant in science from being posed’ (Bhaskar 1989, 15). Whether or not
practice theorists perceive this as a positive thing, this ﬂat ontology is a
signiﬁcant problem for their arguments. For example, it is difﬁcult to
make sense of things like habitus and background without some sense of
ontological depth. When focused on practice a theorist can become
uninterested in actually theorising ‘abstractions’ which would ‘explain’
practice and its conditions of possibility: as such they run the risk of
reproducing the agents’ conceptions and, worse, fail to explain the
structural contexts of practices. Latour’s challenge to social theorists is
addressed again here, albeit differently, through a realist frame.
There is a deeper reason to be concerned – and one that practice
turn theorists should be particularly concerned with. Philosophical
foundations – explicit or implicit – have political and social origins and also
implications. Latour (2004) in our view is right to argue that there may be
problems that arise from the language of ‘social science’ for social scientists’
ability to critique societal tendencies. In this way a critique of social theory
or philosophy of social science is political. Equally, a realist critique of ﬂat
ontology of individualism, for example, is far from apolitical: in enables
and grounds critiques which emphasize social relations and non-atomist
(less liberal) imaginations. Much is politically at stake in being a realist,
non-realist, or an anti-realist: yet, we are not sure these stakes are fully
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apparent, reﬂected on and dealt with in current debates. Certainly
the limitations of realist philosophy can be reﬂected on but so can the
consequences of standing against realism. Instead of hiding our
philosophical or political commitments we here foreground an openly
philosophically realist imagination of philosophy (and sociology) and
one whose political openings and possibilities are openly available for
discussion (see e.g. Kurki 2009). In our view, while practice theorists are
entitled to adopt pragmatism (where knowledge is deﬁned as what
works), this should be openly defended, considered for its philosophical
implications, and the consequences reﬂected on, politically. Friedrichs and
Kratochwil argue that pragmatism is said to be best ‘attuned’ to the practice
turn in social ontology with the added beneﬁt that it rejects Marxist notions
like false consciousness (2009, 713). However, as will become clear below,
this is not the only interpretation of how to deal with practice and in fact sits
uncomfortably with some of the founding ﬁgures of practice theorising. As
we will see in the next section, Bourdieu’s concern with how people are
practically engaged in the ﬁeld (and the false understanding they might have
of this relationship) is at odds with pragmatist arguments that knowledge is
simply a product of social activity.
Drawing on Bourdieu’s notion of social structure
As we have shown, the practice turn is critical of abstractions as a way of
approaching the study of the world. Indeed, the practice turn might seem to
some to be an easy means to avoid problems of abstract debates in IR, for
example the abstract debate on structure vs. agency. In this context
importing Bourdieu into IR might be seen to be a way of adding a degree of
sophistication to this debate given Bourdieu’s own concern to overcome
such a dualism. Bourdieu’s, or Latour’s, analytical frameworks might seem
attractive in their opposition to the abstraction of concepts like structure
and agency. Yet, to think we can avoid abstractions is a problematic way
to come at theorising IR. Such approaches do not themselves escape
abstractions – as we seek to show here through an analysis of IR treatments
of Bourdieu’s approach to ‘social structure’ – but also in denying
abstractions they weaken their conceptualization of ‘social forces’.
We will raise two issues here. First, we suggest that in its treatment of
questions of philosophy and abstraction, the turn to Bourdieu in IR practice
theory, has led to an instrumental appropriation of Bourdieu’s work that
interprets his arguments in either a shallow or selective way, speciﬁcally
ignoring the signiﬁcant role ‘abstraction’ played in his theorizing. Second,
we argue that there are inadequacies in Bourdieu’s own approach and
suggest ways in which this can be better developed through adapting it to a
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realist social ontology.We focus here on the concept of structure because of
its importance as an ‘abstract’ concept not only in the IR ﬁeld and for
critical realists but because of the problematic ways in which it has surfaced
and continues to surface in practice turn analysis in IR. This is not to say
that ‘social structure’ should necessarily be the main way to understand the
social world from a realist perspective, but it is to say that such abstraction
which gets at the ontology beyond practice is absolutely necessary. As we
will show, at the heart of many of the problems with current practice theory
is the inability to adequately abstract, and thus conceptualise, ‘structure’
(or whatever we would call underlying social context) due to a shallow
or surface ontology and an inadequate understanding of the role of
‘philosophical’ arguments about social ontology.
Recent works by Vincent Pouliot (2007, 2008), Emanual Adler (Adler
and Pouliot 2011), and Ted Hopf (2010) provide good examples of an
inconsistent approach to Bourdieu and to the question of structure in
particular. Most of the time this work maintains the kind of ‘practice
constructivist’ ontology that places its emphasis on social practices and
background knowledge. As we shall see below, there is occasionally a
promising notion of structure that seems to be lurking in these ontologies.
Yet such lurking conceptions of structure would seem to be inconsistent
with the anti-realist stance present in much of this work and so is never
properly elaborated into a coherent position. More common is a position
that rejects the idea that structure has any meaningful existence in and of
itself, and which conﬂates structure with its practical instantiation. This is
what links these authors to the likes of Wittgenstein, Searle, Giddens,
and other variations of constructivism. Other approaches like Rebecca
Adler-Nissen’s draw on Bourdieu, but seek to counter his ‘tendency
towards structuralism’, in this case by using the symbolic interactionism of
Goffman to place stress on role-playing, stigma management, and
face-work (Adler-Nissen 2014, 18). Drawing on critical realism, we wish
to show here why it is unnecessary to try to ‘avoid’ structuralism in
such positions.
An initial deﬁnition of practice given by Adler and Pouliot in an
inﬂuential recent article typiﬁes the weak approach to structure and
practice that we are criticizing here. Practices, they claim, are competent
performances and socially meaningful patterns of action (Adler and Pouliot
2011, 4). This notion owes little to Bourdieu but, like Adler-Nissen’s work,
draws from Goffman: particularly, the emphasis on practice as socially
meaningful and recognizable competence or performance (Adler and
Pouliot 2011, 6). This is some distance from the Bourdieusian notion of
practice. The idea of practice as resting on background knowledge is closer
to Bourdieu but is not distinctively Bourdieusian and indeed the authors
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mention Wittgenstein at this point in their argument (Adler and Pouliot
2011, 7).
These initial suggestions lead us to express a degree of confusion when we
ﬁnd the notion of social structure emerging elsewhere in Adler and Pouliot’s
argument. Early on they mention the material and ideational processes
that enable structures to stabilize or evolve and they talk, just like critical
realists, of how agents may reproduce or transform structures (Adler
and Pouliot 2011, 5). We later ﬁnd a strongly appealing argument that
‘practices stabilize social structures and ﬁx ideas or subjectivities in people’s
minds’ (Adler and Pouliot 2011, 20). This is appealing to us because it
differentiates between practices and structures and conceives of practices as
positioned in relation to structures as well as activities. The realist position,
to clarify, argues that practices are socially meaningful activities, but that
this meaningfulness depends upon their relation to the reproduction and
transformation of underlying social structures and generative mechanisms.
Elsewhere, in discussing the practices of the international system, Adler
and Pouliot mention the processes by which both social structures and
social subjectivities are constituted by practices (2011, 22). This might be
compared with the critical realism of Bob Jessop and Ngai-Ling Sum who,
in outlining an approach they call cultural political economy, argue that
practices are oriented to economic structures or systems, but that these are
semiotically, organizationally and institutionally ﬁxed as appropriate
objects of intervention (Sum and Jessop 2013, 166). The problem in Adler
and Pouliot’s account, however, is that at no point is it made clear
exactly what the notion of structure is referring to; it remains an unclear,
unsystematic, and unreﬂexive notion. Our suspicion is that structure
remains in their argument as a consequence of their use of Bourdieu and
perhaps as a result of a difference of emphasis between the authors, but
that it has very little actual meaning. Indeed, in their critique of abstract
structures, a philosophical position on what structure ‘means’ is elided.
Although we may have some disagreement with his conception of
structure, in contrast to the IR theorists, Bourdieu gives the notion
of structure a more meaningful content, talking about such things as
economic structures, kinship relations and linguistics. Elsewhere he gives
further examples of what he means by structures, while emphasizing the
need for a science of those structures that govern social practices:
the prerequisite for a science of common sense representations which seeks
to be more than a complicitous description is a science of the structures
which govern both practices and the concomitant representations, the
latter being principal obstacle to the construction of such a science. Only
by constructing the objective structures (price curves, chances of access to
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higher education, laws of the matrimonial market, etc.) is one able to pose
the question of the mechanisms through which the relationship is
established between the structures and practices or the representations
which accompany them (Bourdieu 1977, 21).
This is clearly an account of the relation between structures and practices
that requires us to make a signiﬁcant ontological distinction. Moreover,
Bourdieu’s concepts of ﬁeld and habitus can only be understood by
keeping structures very much to the fore. To quote again from Bourdieu:
‘These practices can be accounted for only by relating the objective
structure deﬁning the social conditions of the production of the habitus
which engendered them to the conditions in which habitus is operating’
(1977, 78).
Advocates of the practice turnmight want to suggest that what this points
to is not the kind of notion of social structure envisaged by critical realists,
but simply the notion of ﬁeld as background context. This could be given a
deep hermeneutic basis as Hopf does in talking of the deep structure of our
taken-for granted lifeworld (Hopf 2010, 554). This is a point worth
discussing and it is not our aim here to claim that there is a consistently
realist notion of social structure present across the vast range of Bourdieu’s
work. However, we do feel that it is easy to ﬁnd, at the very least, a
structural notion of ﬁeld that would be consistent with a more realist
approach and that this understanding is superior to the social ontology
offered by the practice turn theorists, in which the meaning of the ‘abstract’
term remains empty and philosophically unexplored/unjustiﬁed.
At this point we should emphasize to the reader what is emerging as a
central issue to us. Contrary to whatever the ‘practice turn’ is meant to
imply for our research focus, in our view a key point of Bourdieu’s own
research programme is to highlight the limits of practice. This includes the
limits of practical knowledge and consciousness.
Hence, we would argue that consistent with our views on realism, it is
impossible to fully appreciate some of Bourdieu’s key notions without
recognizing the objective or real nature of social structures which is
required in order to explain misrecognition, habitual reproduction and the
largely unconscious nature of habitus. Bourdieu talks of practical
taxonomies as ‘a transformed, misrecognizable form of the real divisions of
the social order… [that] contribute to the reproduction of that order by
producing objectively orchestrated practices (Bourdieu 1977, 163). This
makes the realist point that such practices produce misrecognition of a real
situation. And rather than being a ‘turn’ to practice and agency, it reﬂects a
central concern with their social or structural constraints, which in turn
implies abstraction, which thus leads to the need to at least consider the
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attractions of a ‘philosophically’ realist, rather than ‘ﬂat realist/empiricist’
reasoning on logic of explanation through practice.
Bourdieu’s emphasis on limited understanding, unconscious reproduc-
tion, and misrecognition is consistent with the realist idea that social
practices and habitus act as the means of mediation between structures and
agents. It is through the unreﬂective practice or limited consciousness
of agents in their routine activities that objective social structures are
reproduced. Rather than rejecting the structure–agency relationship, this
approach to practices highlights the nature of their relationship as well as
suggesting that practices are ‘positioned’ or ‘oriented’ in a certain way. This
is noted, for example, in Wight’s treatment of Bourdieu where a habitus
of positioned practices is a mediating link between agents and the
socio-cultural world that they share (Wight 2006, 49). This in turn comes
from Bhaskar’s argument that we need to understand the ‘point of contact’
between human agency and social structures by examining a mediating
system of positions – places, functions, rules, tasks, duties, etc., and
practices, activities etc., which are engaged in by virtue of agents’
occupancy of social positions. Crucially, this position-practice system is
to be understood relationally (Bhaskar 1989, 40–41).
In our view there are signiﬁcant arguments in Bourdieu’s work that
support the kind of relational approach favoured by approaches such as
critical realism. Bourdieu argues that what exists in the social world are
relations, not interactions between agents or intersubjective ties between
individuals, but objective relations that exist, as Marx says, independent of
consciousness. That is, whether you call social structure a social structure,
there is something beyond the practices which orients actors and it is this
relational orientation which social structure as an abstraction tries to
‘get at’ (whether it does so well, is another question). Crucially, the wider
context is important: for Bourdieu it is provided by the notion of social ﬁeld
which is deﬁned as a network of objective relations between positions
(Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 97).
We pose this reading in strong contrast to that of Hamati-Ataya who
claims that ‘“ﬁeld” and “habitus” signify Bourdieu’s rejection of the
concepts of “structure” and “agency”’. We also reject her Giddensian
conﬂation of ﬁeld and habitus where she writes, as a constructivist would,
that ‘ﬁeld and habitus aremutually constitutive and therefore impossible to
conceptualise or objectivate independently of each other’ (Hamati-Ataya
2012a, 631). This represents the common problem of conﬂating problems
of deﬁnition with the actual properties of the entities themselves. In
actuality, it is clear from Bourdieu’s work that ﬁeld and habitus are seen as
ontologically distinct, with different properties and causal effects. Hence
Bourdieu argues that their relationship is a conditioned one. The ﬁeld
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structures the habitus. The habitus is a product of the immanent necessity of
a ﬁeld. Habitus contributes to the constitution of the ﬁeld as a meaningful
world (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 127). It seems odd to waste such a
useful set of distinctions by using the somewhat ubiquitous constructivist
description of ‘mutual constitution’. Abstractions, whatever they are,
should assist in explaining. Rather than being ‘centrally conﬂated’ (Archer
1995), within a realist frame the relationship between practices and their
context can be seen through a process where antecedently existing relations
constrain and enable agents who operate through a system of mediating
positioned practices.
Such an approach, we believe, is, while not of course the ﬁnal answer to
theorising social practices, a more consistent and helpful approach in
accounting for and delineating the context of practices. It relies on
abstractions, but so do, in fact, practice theory accounts. We, and we think
Bourdieu also, ﬁnd these abstractions helpful in giving a sense of what
practice does and how it does it without ‘ﬂattening’ everything to practices
to the point where nothing explains anything else and where practice starts
to become an empty term. The problemwith avoiding philosophical realism
and abstraction is that it can drive practice theorists not only to a
dismissal of reasonable realist claims about underlying causes and
conditions of possibility, which would complement their vision, but also,
as we argue in the next section, move them in the direction of a limited
sociological vision.
A limited conception of sociology
We have argued here that the introduction of practice theory into IR tends
to ignore some of the problematic philosophical basis of its theorizing and
tends to shun or even misread realism. Certainly, there is a tendency to
ignore the rather complicated equivocations on the question of realism and
abstraction of Bourdieu [and Latour (2010, ch 1); and their differences on
these questions (Bourdieu 2004, 28)]. As the latter part of this article has
shown, closely reading and engaging with the realist tendencies in practice
theory (we focused here on Bourdieu) reveals openings to philosophical
realism. We argue here that practice turn scholars could beneﬁt from open
and perhaps even disputatious engagement with realism, abstraction,
and philosophy. Ultimately, we think that this is necessary because the
arguments against certain philosophical and realist arguments also lead
to a problematic approach to sociology.
We have seen that the practice turn attempts to implement a sociological
turn of sorts – but, it seems to us, it tends to advocate a limited sociology of
actors and their experiences rather than a sociology that genuinely concerns
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itself with understanding the wider social ﬁeld. Hostility to philosophical
claims about the underlying nature of the social world means that,
like positivism, practice theory informed by anti-realism is unable to
conceptualize things beyond what is observable in practice and is thus
trapped in an insider view of the ‘ﬁeld’ that is remarkably unreﬂective about
how the ﬁeld itself might be constituted by anything other than the
agents directly involved.
The consequences of this are particularly problematic to us from an IR
perspective because it seems odd to talk about, for example, IR as a ﬁeld
without seeing that ﬁeld as being heavily shaped by such things as
its proximity to US structural hegemony or global capitalism. Critical
realists like Andrew Collier (1989) would understand this in terms of ‘two
outsides’, one being the intransitive world that theories seek to understand
and the other ‘outside’ being the transitive practices of knowledge acquisi-
tion with their associated schools, institutions, networks, and practices.
Practice theorists would of course talk about US hegemony and global
capitalism but they would reduce these to their instantiation in the practices
of the ‘autonomous’ ﬁeld rather than seeing them as (at least partly)
constitutive of the ﬁeld itself. In an interesting argument Trine Villumsen
Berling (2013) notes how the realist school in IR developed alongside
NATO practices of balance of power and technical military integration.
Although this is true, the explanation only goes so far.
By contrast, we see structural hegemony and global capitalism primarily
in terms of social structure that orients practice rather than as social
practice per se. This is clearly in opposition to practice theorists as well as
constructivists who conﬂate the two as is evident in Pouliot’s assertion of
the ontological priority of the logic of practicality in relation to the mutually
constitutive dynamics between agency and structure (Pouliot 2008, 259). It
is also opposed to attempts to resolve the positioning of practice by recourse
to other practices. Such is the case in Sending and Neumann’s claim that
there are certain ‘anchoring practices’ that render other practices possible
(2011, 237). When they argue for a view of international organizations as a
series of practices with some anchoring of others, we are entitled to ask,
what anchors international organizations themselves? These issues go back
to Ann Swidler’s discussion of cultural practices where she suggests that
anchoring practices constitute socially negotiated realities that coordinate
basic social relationships. She talks of some ‘structures’ (like capitalism) as
deeper and more fundamental and powerful than other practices, but then
goes on to deﬁne these structures as ‘constitutive rules’ of which we have
less direct knowledge (Swidler 2001, 81–86).
In contrast to these conﬂationist approaches, Bourdieu too offers an
argument for a science ‘of the dialectical relations between the objective
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structures to which the objectivist mode of knowledge gives access and the
structured dispositions within which those structures are actualized
and which tend to reproduce them’ (1977, 3). We agree with this as an
ontological statement (i.e. that there is an ontological distinction between
objective structures and structured dispositions) but we disagree with the
epistemological characterization of objectivism as a mode of knowledge.
Indeed, we question the claim that the objectivist mode of knowledge does
actually give access to objective structures. This is because Bourdieu
conceives of objectivism as somewhat similar to what we would call
positivism. Elsewhere Bourdieu talks of objectivism as something that
establishes objective regularities. This is his understanding of such things
as structures, laws, and systems of relationships that are independent of
individual consciousness (1990, 26).
A lot depends on how we understand structures (and indeed perhaps this
is not the most useful way to theorize ‘context’ of practices), but if there is a
problem in Bourdieu’s work it seems to us that it lies in the fact that he
equates structures with the objectivist identiﬁcation of them – an epistemic
fallacy that equates real things with the knowledge we have of them. In fact
we would advocate amore relational approach than Bourdieu insofar as he
appears to identify objective structures with the positivist identiﬁcation
of empirical regularities whereas we maintain that structures are social
relations or orientations. In short, we believe in objective social structures,
or ‘ﬁelds’, beyond ‘practices’ while recognizing that these are relational in
character. They are not reducible to regularities or patterns of behaviour or
events. They have an existence independent of the agents who act within
them. They have an underlying and often unobservable character. And
they condition, and are revealed in, the more concrete practices that
contemporary IR theorists seem so keen to foreground.
We thus follow William Carroll in bringing together realist arguments
and Bourdieu’s arguments about social ﬁelds. Realism addresses the
problem of the disciplinary ﬁelds not by developing sociologies ‘of the
ﬁeld’ but by developing an integrated non-reductionist science of humanity
as a whole. If there is a good reason for a ‘sociological turn’ it is not
because ‘sociology’will somehow help to explain what is going on in IR but
because sociology is the best way to understand the world. And this,
as Carroll ironically notes, is not because sociology represents a strong
or coherent discipline but to the contrary, its virtue resides in its
broad scope, porous boundaries and unsettled character all of which
can help to undermine the ‘enclosures’ of disciplinary social science
(Carroll 2013, 21). A broad, non-disciplinary, speculative and conceptually
open and ﬂexible sociology beneﬁtting from realist philosophical insights is
not antithetical to, although it develops in a distinct direction, the vision of
The limits of practice 91
use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S175297191700015X
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Aberystwyth University, on 16 Jul 2018 at 10:18:51, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of
social analysis of Bourdieu. It is this vision of sociology we wish
to foreground.
This leads us to take stock of the contribution critical realism canmake to
practice theory. Rather than limiting philosophy to its relationship to
practices, we argued that critical realism takes on board the need to make
claims through abstractions about a wider and deeper reality. The above
table clariﬁes the position we defend. In sum, we propose a philosophically
realist form of practice theory which pays attention to the role of
abstraction, the limits of ﬂat ontology, the need to grapple with structures
(unobservable as they are) and unintended consequences they can generate,
and thus a wider view of sociology which is attuned not only practice but
also the limits of practice (Table 1).
Conclusion
As Cornelia Navari (2011) notes, the notion of practice lies in the middle
ground between more individualistic approaches and more holistic struc-
tural explanations. There is no reason to think that we have to choose
between such options, but rather, the issue is where to place the emphasis.
Table 1. Approaches to Philosophy
Practice view Realist view Combination
Philosophy linked to the
practice–knowledge–
action relationship
Philosophy as both an
underlabourer and maker
of metaphysical claims
Philosophy has a wide-ranging role
based on ontological realism,
epistemological relativism and
judgmental rationalism
Rejection of conceptual/
philosophical
abstraction
Need for conceptual
abstraction and
metaphysical arguments
Practice theory gets at the empirics of
how practices work while realism
gets at underlying causal
mechanisms and conditions of
possibility
Flat ontology Stratiﬁed depth ontology Combination is not possible. Flat
ontology should be rejected in
favour of a stratiﬁed depth ontology
that includes practices as a central
part.
Practice-based ontology Structure-agency question Ontology of structure-practice-agent
with particular importance given to
the process of social reproduction as
well as unintended consequences
Wary of ontological
claims
Ontological claims about
nature of reality
Need ontological claims to situate
practices and our understanding
of them
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A critical realist approach helps insofar as it can see the distinctiveness of
each aspect of the relationship between structure, practices, and agents. To
put it in Navari’s terms, social structures, although conceived of by us
as underlying, are not to be understood separately from the agents’
participation in them. Furthermore, we can agree with Janice Bially
Mattern that: ‘While structure is necessary for the emergence of practice,
practice does what structure cannot; it generates human being’ and that
‘while practice creates agency, agency does what practice cannot: it
transforms practice’ (2011, 75). We agree with Bially Mattern that social
structures cannot be understood separately from the agents’ participation
in them (2011, 618), a point also made by Bhaskar (1989).2 However, we
also follow Navari’s understanding of a more structuralist position as
identiﬁed in Bourdieu’s attempt to ﬁnd ‘an anchor in which to ground
habitual behaviour’ (2011, 263).
This article argues that there are limitations to the approaches to IR
which prioritize practice. These limitations are partly philosophical and
partly analytical but in their effects are quite concrete in shaping empirical
accounts of world politics. If the practice turn leads to a failure to explain
the conditions of practice, this turn may in fact obfuscate more than assist in
IR theorists’ attempts to grapple with complex world political processes.
Practice theory is surely not without its uses: it can help to enlighten some
new aspects of international politics and to explain some aspects of the
activities of world political actors and indeed IR scholars. We also welcome
the desire among a new wave of scholars to develop a critical approach that
challenges the conservatism of established theories including both con-
structivism and poststructuralism. Also, the critiques of the potency of
‘social science critiques’ arising from approaches such as ANT are impor-
tant. However, in turning to sociology through ‘practice’ there is a danger
of IR theorists turning to sociology with a limited sociological imagination
that restricts our ability not only to talk about the world, but also to critique
and change it. We argue that realist foundations can provide an important
grounding for practice theory. Realist philosophy cannot allow us to study
the sociological trends and practices but can do this while maintaining a
focus on the contexts that provide the conditions of possibility of
practice. This leads to a richer and indeed potentially more questioning
2 Critical realism argues that social structures, unlike natural structures, do not exist inde-
pendently of the activities they govern. Nor are social structures independent of agent’s concep-
tion of their activities. However, this intentional activity may have unconscious or unintentional
consequences (of structural reproduction/elaboration). Social structures, in contrast to natural
ones, are only relatively enduring. Their existence is ‘spatio-temporally moored’ and ‘geo-
historically reproduced, distantiated and transformed’ (Bhaskar 1989, 175).
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social science. Philosophical positions are not necessarily ‘truths’ – it would
be presumptuous to assume the truth of any one philosophical system – but
they do require engagement with because they are unavoidable in how we
read the world and, moreover, give grounding to social analysis and
political viewpoints. Similarly, abstractions such as ‘social structures’ are
not necessarily the ‘ﬁnal words’ that we should be forever bound to, yet
they too are necessary and inescapable and when done well, can achieve
exactly what critics like Latour call for, the kind of ‘lifting’ of our plane of
sight from ‘what and where we are’.
Rather than moving us away from concrete analysis, abstraction is
precisely the means by which knowledge attempts to grasp the differentia-
tions of the world and to individuate objects through characterising their
main attributes and relations (Sayer 1992, 86). In particular, abstractions
help us to identify structures, understood, according to Sayer, as sets of
internally related objects or practices (1992, 92), and people, understood
according to their positioning and roles within these structures and the
possibilities and limitations that come with this. We believe that this is
consistent with Bourdieu’s approach and indeed with Michael Williams,
one of the few IR scholars to have recognized the challenge posed by the
necessity ‘of abstraction, moving away from the purely subjective
experiences of individuals to the structural level of the conditions of their
possibility, without losing sight of the need to reintegrate these insights with
the continual practical creativity of agents’ (Williams 2013, 134).
While scientiﬁc and critical realism have been seen to be antithetical to the
practice turn which has emphasized the need to ‘ﬂatten’ ontological assump-
tions and avoid philosophical speculation, we have hoped to show practice
theory need not be so. Practice theory, including Bourdieu’s theorizing, can be
understood and addressed through the realist tradition. We are not, to clarify,
insisting on practice theory and realism as long-lost sister traditions naturally
pushing in the same direction. Rather, we argue that interpreting the insights
of practice theory through a realist lens, and thus also recovering the realist
assumptions in practice theory of theorists such as Bourdieu, is fruitful for
how IR theorists use and engage with this theoretical tradition. If practice
theory is a tradition it is a wide-ranging tradition, which can be built,
augmented and morphed into divergent directions. This realist orientation, we
argue, is helpful today for IR theorists in both identifying what is at stake in
theorizing practice in IR and in allowing a renegotiation of the nature of
practice and practice theory in awaywhich allows for ‘big theory’, ‘abstraction’
and, crucially, also ‘speculation’ on causal forces beyond practice.
Just as pragmatism is not the only solution to our problems of
knowledge, philosophical realism may not be the only solution either.
Yet, in highlighting the limits of practice vision it can be a positive and
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productive way of understanding the signiﬁcance and also theorizing the
meaning of practices. Any commitments in a realist framework, or any other
framework (such as pragmatism) should be reﬂexive and open-ended but,
surely, as such, better than naïvely thinking we can face the world unhindered
by philosophical or sociological problems of knowledge. Philosophy may not
be the only solution but it is not a hindrance either; sociology may hold much
promise but without a reﬂective philosophical grounding it too can result in
an unhelpful reproduction of limited sociological consciousness.
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